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Abstract 
Contemporary English abortion law is now typically thought to be a development of the twentieth 
century, and little academic attention has been paid to its development before the 1938 case of 
R v Bourne or the Abortion Act 1967. Sir James Fitzjames Stephen’s nineteenth century 
perspectives on pregnancy, abortion and the doctrine of necessity informing the basis of 
contemporary governance of abortion, child destruction, and infanticide as distinct from 
homicide, are often overlooked. Stephen understood abortion, child destruction and infanticide 
as distinct crimes with a common motivation and intention. The desperation of women to 
conceal or remedy the ‘miserable’ and emotionally destabilising condition of unplanned 
pregnancy typically defined each crime; the exception being cases of medical emergency during 
pregnancy which sometimes defined abortion and child destruction. Stephen argued that 
punishment required public assent and support in order to deter crime, and severe punishment 
in these cases rarely had either. In the twentieth century Stephen’s radical Victorian arguments 
to conceptualise abortion as a legitimate medical procedure (in the case of necessity), and to 
characterise child-killing as distinct from homicide, were finally effective: his model for law 
therefore informs contemporary English law in these areas. 
 
Keywords: Fitzjames Stephen, abortion, Abortion Act 1967, child destruction, infanticide 
medical procedure, R v Bourne 
 
Introduction 
In the nineteenth century Sir James Fitzjames Stephen was well known as a highly influential 
Victorian patriarch: an Indian administrator, jurisprudent, Queen’s Bench judge, political theorist 
and prolific journalist, who was John Stuart Mill’s greatest contemporary nemesis. Stephen’s 
anti-democratic ideals led him to fall into disfavour and then obscurity after his death in 1894. 
From the twentieth century, Stephen was almost universally remembered, if at all, as a 
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Calvinistic puritan who led a charge against Evangelical tender-mindedness and democracy2 
and women’s suffrage.3 Notoriously, Stephen described the Sermon on the Mount as the 
‘hardest part’ of Christianity to accept,4 and publicised his contempt for the ‘sentimentality’ of 
Charles Dickens.5 His particular opposition to the discourse of women’s rights - the ‘pet 
opinions’ of the liberal intelligentsia6 – were characterised by Benjamin Lippincott as ‘the moral 
zeal of an indignant puritan, who was out to save the world from the devil’.7 On Stephen’s death, 
The Times described him as anachronistic to his own era for persisting with antidemocratic 
ideals ‘unpalatable’ even to his own generation and society.8 
 
Stephen is not well enough known today, given his impact on the development of the criminal 
law. In this article I focus on a small aspect of Stephen’s impact, in regard to his legacy in 
formulating the crimes of abortion and child-killing. Contemporary English abortion law is now 
typically thought to be a development of the twentieth century, and ‘remarkably little academic 
attention’ has been paid to its development before the 1938 case of R v Bourne or the Abortion 
Act 1967.9 However, here I argue that it was Stephen’s nineteenth century perspectives on 
pregnancy, abortion and the doctrine of necessity that form the basis of contemporary 
governance of abortion, child destruction, and infanticide as distinct from homicide. Questions of 
the origins of life and personhood as broached in the law concerning abortion, child destruction 
and infanticide were fundamental to Stephen’s vision for the criminal law, and informed his 
criminal codes and treatises. Stephen advocated capital punishment, but in select cases 
including child-killing and abortion, he argued for punishment less severe. His approach was 
pragmatic, taking into account the need for law to be aligned with public morality and sentiment 
in order to possess legitimacy.  
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Stephen understood abortion, child destruction and infanticide as distinct crimes with a common 
motivation and intention. The desperation of women to conceal or remedy the ‘miserable’ and 
emotionally destabilising condition of unplanned pregnancy typically defined each crime;10 in the 
exception being cases of medical emergency during pregnancy, which sometimes defined 
abortion and child destruction. Stephen also understood the three crimes to have a similar effect 
on society, less comprehensive than the killing of an adult. He believed the crimes shared a 
common relationship to public morality and sentiment, because juries were usually sympathetic 
to women with unplanned pregnancies (especially illegitimate pregnancies), and the crimes 
therefore shared a common relationship to the effects of punishment. Stephen argued that 
punishment required public assent and support in order to deter crime, and severe punishment 
in these cases rarely had either. In the twentieth century Stephen’s radical Victorian arguments 
to conceptualise abortion as a legitimate medical procedure (in the case of necessity), and to 
characterise child-killing as distinct from homicide, were finally effective: his model for law 
informs contemporary English law in these areas. 
 
Women were ‘on the periphery’ of medical and legal debates about abortion in the nineteenth 
century,11 and it was left to jurists and doctors to formulate its governance. In Stephen, women 
found an unlikely ally who was influential in abortion being recognised as a legitimate medical 
procedure. With regards to infanticide, Stephen has been identified as ‘the faint voice in the 
wilderness’ shaping the law that treats infanticide as manslaughter rather than murder’12 to  
provide special consideration for women who kill their children. But the centrality of the question 
of child-killing to Stephen’s greater project of criminal law reform has not been explored in 
depth; and research in general into the genesis and development of abortion law has been 
‘sparse’.13 In regard to his impact on the lives of women, Stephen is far more famous today for 
his opposition to suffrage than his contribution to the modern laws that provide for abortion and 
govern child-killing. Paradoxically, the basis of modern abortion law rests on the arguments of a 
conservative, punitive jurist who believed women to be maddened by pregnancy, not on liberal 
sentiments or solicitude for women’s health and rights, as abortion law reform came to be 
argued for in the late twentieth century.  
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First I briefly outline the treatment of abortion and child-killing in the law before the movement 
for criminal law reform of the 1860s and 1870s. Next I explain Stephen’s conceptualisation of 
these crimes and his arguments presented to the 1863 Royal Commission on Capital 
Punishment, which centred on the motivation for child-killing; its effects; and its relationship to 
public morality. Third I explain Stephen’s advancement of the doctrine of necessity in regard to 
abortion and child destruction, within the Homicide Bill 1872 and within his draft criminal code 
for England in 1878. I conclude by explaining how Stephen’s vision for abortion and child-killing 
laws were realised in the twentieth century and came to inform the Bourne judgment, which 
governed English abortion law until the late 1960s, and continues to form a basis for 
international abortion governance. In this article, abortion, child destruction and infanticide are 
discussed together. Although they constitute different activities with different social and medical 
meanings, during the nineteenth century and within Stephen’s arguments, the three crimes were 
thought to represent related phenomena. Twentieth century abortion law, derived in particular 
from Bourne, cannot be understood separate from the law of child destruction (which was 
thought to relate to infanticide). 
 
1 Abortion, Child Destruction and Infanticide Before Reform. 
Abortion was an ecclesiastical offence, but as it came to find a place in the common law, it was 
not a crime when performed prior to ‘quickening’. Like the offences of incest, bigamy, 
‘overlaying children’ and ravishment, procuring an abortion was viewed as an issue relating to 
the ‘relation of the sexes’ and not punishable by the state.14 ‘Quickening’ referred to the stage at 
which a woman first felt the foetus move, usually at around five months. Both Bracton and Fleta 
held that it was ‘murder’ to kill a foetus post-quickening. However, Coke wrote that it was ‘no 
murder’, only a great misprision (misdemeanour); Coke insisted that a murder victim must be a 
‘reasonable creature in being’. It is unclear whether abortion at any stage was prosecuted under 
the common law, as relevant case law of the era is ‘close to non-existent’15 but in 1803 
procuring an abortion at any stage of pregnancy was made a felony, with the ‘quickening’ 
distinction maintained to indicate the graver offence of later abortion. Lord Ellenbrough’s Act 
1803 created a capital offence to wilfully, maliciously, and unlawfully administer to, or cause to 
be administered, or taken by any of his Majesty’s subjects, any deadly poison, or other noxious 
and destructive substance or thing, with intent such his Majesty’s subject or subjects thereby to 
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murder, or thereby to cause and procure the miscarriage of any woman, then being quick with 
child. 
 
The main thrust of the 1803 Act was to consolidate offences of assaults and attempts to wound, 
and so on. The abortion prohibition seems ‘almost incidental’16 to the general prohibition against 
attempting to poison with attempt to murder; moreover, there was no great public alarm about 
abortion at the time.17 By the 1830s abortion was widespread; therapeutic abortions were 
acceptable to many doctors18 but also condemned by many within the medical establishment 
and the judiciary. In 1836 for example, the Manual of Medical Jurisprudence described abortion 
as a heinous crime, the murder of a human being from the moment of conception.19 In the same 
year the Legal Examiner identified abortion as the ‘destruction of human life’ and argued for its 
criminality because sexual freedom in women would result in the bonds that sustained society 
being ‘broken asunder’.20 In the nineteenth century, abortion law evolved to become less 
discretionary, and to make it easier to secure convictions. The Criminal Law Commission of 
1836 recommended the reduction of capital punishment for abortion, and the removal of the 
quickening distinction, in order to remove an evidentiary difficulty. As the medical profession 
consolidated itself and became more influential and concerned to deter lay abortionists, the 
notion of quickening was viewed as unscientific and distracting for juries; capital punishment 
was thought to deter convictions. The Commission’s recommendations were enacted in the 
Offences Against the Person Act 1837.  
 
The 1837 statute did not explicitly allow for lawful abortion procured therapeutically. In 1845 the 
Criminal Law Commissioners noted that therapeutic justifications for abortion were provided in 
the criminal codes of other countries (for example, Macaulay’s Indian Code), and that it would 
be ‘expedient’ to provide a justification in English law for abortion procured ‘in good faith with the 
intention of saving the life of the woman’,21 but this recommendation was not acted on. The 
1856 Commission, further influenced by the medical profession’s campaign against ‘irregulars’ 
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(midwives and others), proposed to extend the law to punish abortion attempts whether or not 
the woman was pregnant. This was reflected in the Offences Against the Person Act 1861, 
which also expressly prohibited self-abortion. Existing law did not appear to address the crime 
of child destruction: the deliberate killing of a child in the process of its birth was not addressed 
by abortion law (addressing the miscarriage of pregnancy) or by homicide (addressing ‘any 
reasonable creature in being’). David Richard Seaborne Davies identified this situation as 
having left ‘a wide gap through which many malefactors walked with impunity’.22  
 
Historically, infanticide was bound up with ecclesiastical offences of adultery and fornication, 
and was considered by the courts to be a particularly heinous form of murder.23 The Stuart Act 
of 1623 made proof of concealment of an illegitimate infant’s death sufficient proof to convict for 
murder, thereby punishing single women for ‘becoming pregnant and for refusing to live with 
their sin’,24 but by the reign of George II the law was not enforced. In 1803 Lord Ellenborough’s 
Act amended the 1623 Act, and accusations of women murdering their illegitimate children 
came to be governed by the same rules of evidence as murder. The 1803 Act also created an 
offence of concealment of birth, in the case where the child had died. By the mid nineteenth 
century, however, the shame of illegitimate birth was increasingly thought by many to reduce 
the heinousness of abortion and child-killing: it was evident that infanticidal women (and those 
who procured abortions in the case of illegitimacy) were usually poor, uneducated and 
unmarried - the ‘stepchildren of society’ who had been abandoned by their lovers.25  Men were 
typically blamed for pressuring women to kill their children,26 and the application to such women 
of the full force of the law was considered by many to be barbaric; capital or severe punishment 
in these cases was thought to have deterred juries and judges from convicting.27 After 1849 no 
woman was hanged for killing her child, and by the 1860s public anger and frustration arose at 
acquittals for infanticide made on the ‘most slender’ of grounds28 and a belief, ‘widely held but 
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not uncontested’, that the failed law had led to an increase in murders of children.29 In the 1860s 
scandals erupted when illegitimate infants supposed to have been cared for at ‘baby farms’ 
were found to be murdered or starved to death routinely. The 1865 trial of Charlotte Winsor for 
smothering a child a dumping his body at the roadside brought baby farming to ‘national, as well 
as international’ attention.30 
 
2 Classifying Child Destruction and Infanticide; the Royal Commission into 
 Capital Punishment 1863 
The breakdown of the law in regard to infanticide was one important focus for the Royal 
Commission into Capital Punishment that was instigated in 1863. The Commission was the ‘first 
official forum’ to address infanticide.31 It was preoccupied with child murder in regard to which it 
was widely claimed that the law had ‘completely broken down’.32 In their evidence, judges 
identified the current treatment of infanticide as performing a ‘solemn mockery’ of the law.33 It 
was noted that juries, and even judges, were reluctant to convict especially when the child was 
newly born and when proof of live birth was difficult to obtain, given that most women gave birth 
at home. The Commissioners agreed the current law was unworkable: some wanted to ‘go back 
to a time when women were hanged for child murder’,34 and others had a greater interest in 
securing more convictions for child-killing.35 As a QC, Stephen gave evidence to the Royal 
Commission, and in June 1864 he published a report on its deliberations in Fraser’s Magazine. 
In both forums Stephen argued strongly for capital publishment of homicide except in select 
cases, including child-killing. In particular, he argued for special consideration and lighter 
punishment of women who killed their children. 
 
Stephen generally had great faith in punishment to deter crime and satisfy society’s need for 
justice. He believed that punishment served to put into effect society’s hatred of crime.36 In 
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Fraser’s he publicly advocated what he viewed as Bentham’s endorsement of the pleasure of 
vengeance:  
 Sweetness produced from terror, honey from the lion’s throat. Produced without 
 expense, the net result of an operation necessary on other grounds, it is an enjoyment to 
 be cultivated like any other; for the pleasure of vengeance, considered in the abstract, is 
 like every other pleasure, a good in itself.37  
 
His brother Leslie descried Stephen as having ‘sat at the feet of Bentham’.38 But Stephen did 
not derive his arguments for capital punishment from Bentham, who considered all punishment 
‘an evil which should be imposed only if it promised to exclude some greater evil’, and was 
‘totally opposed’ to the death penalty.39 In Fraser’s, Stephen advocated capital punishment 
because ‘no other punishment deters men so effectually from committing murder’. He continued 
that ‘no other punishment gratifies and justifies in so emphatic a manner the vindictive 
sentiment, the existence of which is one of the great safeguards against crime’. And concluded 
that ‘no other way of disposing of great criminals is equally effectual, appropriate and cheap’.40 
Stephen viewed most objections to capital punishment as misguidedly ‘sentimental’, and those 
who voiced them as ‘too soft and pitiful’.41 He regretted that the remedy was no longer available 
for attempted murder, or for some forms of burglary and highway robbery.42 He feared that the 
modern age revered the Jesus of the Sermon on the Mount over a vengeful God, and had 
thereby lost sight of the fact that ‘the toleration of what ought not to be tolerated is nearly as 
great as an evils as the persecution of what ought to be tolerated’. Stephen understood the 
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opposition to capital punishment not as a sign of increasing humanity, but as cowardice; he 
noted that there was ‘as much moral cowardice in shrinking from the execution of a murderer as 
in hesitating to blow out the brains of a foreign invader’.43  
 
In the Commission proceedings and elsewhere, however, Stephen argued that capital 
punishment was not an appropriate response to infanticide and abortion. He described 
infanticide as ‘more like procuring abortion’ than murder and argued for the creation of a new 
criminal offence of infanticide, with punishment less severe than homicide.44 The classification 
of crimes of abortion and child destruction was central to Stephen’s greater project of law 
reform, which centred on his interpretation of killing. In the Commission he argued that a 
nuanced definition of murder was of the ‘highest importance’, so as to render the law more 
‘rational and symmetrical’ by reflecting the various culpabilities associated with killing, some of 
which would be ‘monstrous to punish with perpetual imprisonment’.45 In regard to child 
destruction in particular, he drew a clear contrast with homicide. In his History of the Criminal 
Law of 1883, Stephen wrote that the offence of killing a child in the act of birth should be 
provided for in law, ‘punishable with extreme severity, as it borders on murder’, but he clarified 
that the offence ‘should not be confounded with murder’.46 Accordingly, in response to the 
problem of determining when a foetus was a reasonable creature in being and thereby 
protected by homicide provisions, Stephen wrote that 
 
The line must obviously be drawn either at the point where the foetus begins to live, or at the 
point at which it begins to have a life independent of its mother’s life, or at a point when it has 
completely proceeded into the world from its mother’s body. It is almost equally obvious that the 
last of these three periods is the one which is most convenient to choose. The practical 
importance of the distinction is that it draws the line between the offence of procuring an 
abortion and the offences of murder and manslaughter….  
 The conduct, the intentions, and the motives which usually lead to the one offence are 
 so different from those which lead to the other, the effects of the two crimes are also so 
 dissimilar, that it is well to draw a line which makes it practically impossible to confound 
 them. The line has in fact been drawn at this point by the law of England.47  
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This contradicted the recommendations of the 1846 Criminal Law Commission, that severance 
of the child from the woman’s body need not have occurred for the child to be regarded as a 
person protected by homicide provisions.48 Although Seaborne Davies characterised Victorian 
judges considering child destruction as ‘wallow[ing] in the troughs of difficult questions of 
physiology’,49 Stephen’s judgement of the matter was based less on a view of the 
characteristics of the foetus and its development, and more on what he determined to be the 
criminal nature of child-killing in general. He understood the crime as the product of women’s 
weak post-natal temperaments. Writing in Fraser’s he emphasised the ‘condition into which a 
woman is thrown by the pains of childbirth’, whereby she has ‘so little control over her 
conduct’,50 and he argued to the Royal Commission that the operation of the criminal law:  
 presupposes in the mind of the person who is acted upon a normal state of strength, 
 reflective power and soon, but a woman just after child-birth is so upset, and is in such 
 an hysterical state altogether, that it seems to me you cannot deal with her in the same 
 manner as if she was in a regular and proper state of health… besides that, there is a 
 strong sympathy which it is never safe to neglect, and which will always exist, with the 
 miserable condition of the woman; and there is a sort of feeling (I do not say it is very 
 reasonable, and I do not know exactly how to connect it with the fact) as a general rule 
 against the father of the child, who goes unpunished, which makes its way with juries 
 and with the public.51  
 
Stephen had a great interest in insanity defences, which he explored at length in the History of 
the Criminal Law.52 He campaigned for the notion of the ‘irresistible impulse’ to fall within the 
defence of insanity, which would have broadened immunity considerably.53 In this context, the 
concept of puerperal insanity had become popular in English psychiatric and obstetric medical 
circles after the 1820s.54 There was also much debate about sanity and criminal responsibility 
following the 1843 McNaughten [M’Naghten] case and the rules it outlined in regard to pleas of 
insanity where a defendant ‘did not know what he was doing’ at the time he committed the 
crime.55 Stephen’s belief that ‘you have to legislate for human behaviour as you find it’56  was 
based on his personal view of human nature – that certain individuals were especially weak and 
vulnerable, and should be judged accordingly – and his respect for civil liberties to defend the 
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rights of those whose illegal activities were the result of a ‘deranged mind’.57 Martin Wiener 
argues that from the mid Victorian period opinions about the differences between the sexes 
such as ‘women’s physical weakness, ever more insisted upon’, conflicted with movements 
promoting ‘the universalising struggle against instinct’ that saw ‘similar dangers in all human 
nature and demanded similar remedies of character building’,58 particularly in regard to the 
treatment of crime. Accordingly, Stephen’s position on homicide and child-killing contradicted 
many established legal views. For example, Baron Bramwell’s argument to the Commission was 
that it was the very great temptation of infanticide, especially to women with illegitimate children, 
that necessitated greater punishment in these situations.59 Blackburn also argued for extending 
culpable negligence to the period of pregnancy.60  
 
While others were motivated to reform the law to secure more convictions, Stephen was 
motivated by his view of the mental element of the crime, the need for law to align with public 
morality and opinion, and his view of the very purpose of punishment. Stephen understood 
crime in general terms of its mental element and potential for deterrence, and thought it ‘absurd’ 
to punish distinct classes of crime in a uniform fashion.61 The point of punishment was to 
remove from the criminal the power to recommit the offence, and to generate a ‘terror’ of 
punishment among potential offenders as well as hatred for the crime itself among the general 
public. Stephen saw the role of public opinion in regulating society as of utmost importance, and 
wrote in the Cornhill Magazine that 
 if any person of ordinary decency and morality will honestly ask himself what is the real 
 reason why he should not commit a murder, however great might be the gain, and 
 however small the risk, he will find that no small part of his reluctance to do so arises 
 from the horror in which the crime is universally held and which he as one of the public 
 shares.62  
 
The Royal Commission concluded by recommending the creation of a new offence of inflicting 
grievous bodily harm on a baby within seven days of its birth, where the baby had subsequently 
died, and with no proof required that the child had been born alive.63 There was much debate in 
the Commission about the time limit to grant women this relative mercy. Home Secretary 
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Spencer Walpole suggested three months; others argued for three days, as in France.64 
Stephen however, argued for a more flexible approach, stating that he would not wish to limit 
the time ‘very nicely’ because the effect of childbirth on a woman’s nerves lasts for a 
‘considerable time’ in some cases. He testified to the Commission that he ‘would rather have a 
little indefiniteness in the law than run the risk of an encounter between the law and public 
sentiment’.65 The seven-day limit was agreed on, but subsequent bills failed in parliament 
because the provision appeared to place a lesser value on infant life. In Fraser’s Stephen had 
argued that infanticide was different from homicide because of its motivation and effect: 
 
 There can be no doubt that the temptation is so strong, the power of resisting it, under 
 the circumstances, so weak, and it must fairly be owned, the mischief done is so much 
 less, that there is no use in calling it by the same name as the deliberate destruction of a 
 grown up person. A new-born child, or a child in the act of being born, certainly falls 
 within the only definition of a human being that can be given, but that is all that can be 
 said of it.  
 
 Murder is a great crime because it inflicts a terrible loss on a circle of people more or 
 less extensive; because it puts an end to all the interests, occupations, and objects of 
 the person murdered; because it gratifies bad passions, and alarms those who are in 
 circumstances similar to the murdered person. In the case of a new-born child murdered 
 by its own mother, every one of these evils is of necessity at a minimum. No one except 
 the mother even knows of the child’s existence, the child itself loses nothing, the motive 
 is always the same; and it is one on which the fear of punishment will operate less than 
 on any other likely to lead to such a result, especially when the bodily and mental pain 
 under which the offender is suffering are taken in to account, and new born children are 
 incapable of feeling alarm.66  
 
Tony Ward has cited this argument as evidence of Stephen’s ‘hardhearted utilitarian’ character 
and ideology, in its having ‘put a lesser value on infant life’,67 but in doing so, Ward might have 
simplified both Stephen and utilitarianism. In formulating the crime of infanticide Stephen was 
most concerned with the motivation for the killing, and secondarily, with its effect. He wrote that 
it was not desirable to ‘try to get people to view the crime of killing a new-born child, from 
motives of shame, in the same light as that of killing an adult, from motives of gain and 
revenge’.68 Stephen identified the special relationship between victim and perpetrator as 
                                                 
64
 Behlmer, Child Abuse and Moral Reform in England, p.20. 
65
 Sir James Fitzjames Stephen, ‘Capital Punishments’, p.758. 
66
 Ibid. 
67
 T Ward, ‘Legislating for Human Nature: Legal Responses to Infanticide 1860-1938’ in Mark Jackson 
(ed) Infanticide: Historical Perspectives on Child Murder and Concealment 1550-2000 (Aldershot 
Ashgate, 2002), 249-269, p.57. 
68
 Sir James Fitzjames Stephen, ‘Capital Punishments’ p.765. 
Plymouth Law and Criminal Justice Review (2016) 1 
 
60 
 
defining the crime of infanticide: at no stage did he suggest special consideration for the general 
killing of infants, other than by their mothers in a ‘miserable’ and irrational condition.69  
3 Therapeutic Abortion and Necessity 
In 1872 the Infant Life Protection Act was enacted to licence baby farms and quell the furore 
that surrounded them. Following the deliberations of the 1863 Commission, Stephen was 
enlisted to another commission help draft the Homicide Law Amendment Bill of 1872, which 
addressed the neglected crime of child destruction by defining a person as including ‘every child 
in the act of birth that has breathed’. Killing in such cases was thereby identified as a form of 
homicide. This provision was the work of the broader Commission, not Stephen, who as I have 
noted, did not classify child destruction as murder. The Homicide Bill did however reflect 
Stephen’s view of women and of infanticide by providing that if a woman murdered her child at, 
or soon after birth, and ‘whilst deprived of her ordinary powers of self-control’, a judge had the 
discretion to sentence her to penal servitude to any term of not less that five years.70 This 
marked the beginning of series of attempts in England to have infanticide treated as 
manslaughter rather than murder. 
 
The Homicide Bill was rejected by a Select Committee in 1874. Its rejection accelerated 
Stephen’s campaign for codification of the English criminal law, again focused on killing. In 1877 
he published his ambitious Digest of the Criminal Law, on the basis of which he was enlisted by 
Lord Chancellor Cairns to draft a criminal code for England.71 In May 1878, Stephen’s Criminal 
Code (Indictable Offences) Bill was tabled in parliament, and after second reading it became the 
subject of a Royal Commission. This Bill again focused on child-killing. Chapter XIX concerned 
homicide and commenced by defining the offence as ‘the killing of a human being by a human 
being’ with the accompanying clarification that,  
 a child becomes a human being within the meaning of this definition when it has 
 completely proceeded in a living state from the body of its mother, whether or not it has 
 breathed, and whether the navel string has or has not been divided, and the killing of 
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 such a child is homicide, whether it is killed by injuries inflicted before, during, or after 
 birth. 
 A living child in its mother’s womb, or a child in the act of birth, even though such a child 
 may have breathed, is not a human being within the meaning of this definition, and the 
 killing of such a child is not homicide (section 131).72 
 
This was an important distinction, which was at odds with the failed 1872 Homicide Bill. In the 
Royal Commission on Capital Punishment and elsewhere, commentators had suggested that 
child destruction was often performed before the child had fully proceeded from its mother.73 
Under Stephen’s proposed law such an act would not be a capital offence.  
 
Stephen understood child destruction as a form of abortion, punishable by life imprisonment, 
when not performed for therapeutic reasons. He did not consider abortion or child destruction to 
be homicide. In keeping with his understanding of abortion as historically concerning the 
‘regulation of the sexes’, he grouped abortion offences in Section 165 of his 1878 Code together 
with the sexual misconduct offences of rape and ‘knowing children’. Under the heading 
‘Procuring Abortion’, he included the offence of causing the ‘death of any living child which has 
not proceeded in a living state from the body of its mother by any act or omission which would 
have amounted to murder of such a child’. As in the Homicide Bill, Stephen defined a crime of 
infanticide as manslaughter when performed during or immediately after birth, if the woman was 
at the time ‘deprived by reason of bodily or mental suffering of the power of self control’ (in 
section 138 of his Code). 
 
During his codification campaign of the 1870s, Stephen also publicised the idea that abortion 
and child destruction might be understood in terms of necessity. In the classic texts, necessity 
was identified as roughly similar to duress involving objective circumstances where 
emergencies might compel people to act in ways that would otherwise be criminal. For example, 
the texts cited situations of choosing the ‘lesser of two evils’, usually involving property and 
liberty, such as where a house is destroyed to prevent a fire spreading, or where prisoners 
leave a burning gaol to save themselves, or sailors jettison cargo to lighten a boat in a storm.74 
Stephen was unimpressed with the leading judgment on necessity, R v Dudley and Stephens,75 
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which held that shipwrecked sailors were guilty of murder for killing a cabin boy to eat, in order 
to save themselves from starvation. It was held that the sailors were neither excused of 
homicide by the mitigating circumstances, nor justified in their attempts to save three lives at the 
cost of one.76 Commenting on the case in his Digest of the Criminal Law, Stephen wrote that he 
would have agreed with the judgement of the court that rejected the defence, but not with its 
reasoning.77 Stephen understood necessity as an excuse: a type of compulsion by circumstance 
that formed an exception to the general rule that people are responsible for actions falling within 
the definition of crimes.78 His reasoning was that ‘when men are put under compulsion, when 
they are subjected to motives at once terrible and exceedingly powerful, the great majority of 
them will act in the same way’.79  
 
Departing from the classic examples noted above, in both his Digest and History of the Criminal 
Law, Stephen identified abortion and child destruction as providing clear examples of when 
necessity might be valid, whereby ‘in delivering a woman it is necessary to sacrifice the child’s 
life to save the mother’. He clarified that it would however be murder to sacrifice a pregnant 
woman’s life ‘in order to produce an heir’.80 Stephen was the first to bring to bear the defence of 
necessity on questions of abortion and infanticide, a move that would come to fruition many 
years later in the 1938 judgment in R v Bourne. In section 23 of his 1878 Code, Stephen 
included necessity as a General Exception to criminal liability and offered the following 
explanation, with explicit provision for women in childbirth:  
 No act is an offence which is done only in order to avoid consequences which could not 
 otherwise be avoided, and which if they had followed would have inflicted upon the 
 person doing the act, or upon others whom he was bound to protect, inevitable and 
 irreparable evil, and if no more is done than is reasonably necessary for that purpose 
 intended nor likely to be disproportionate to the evil intended to be avoided.  
 
 No act which causes harm to the person of another is an offence if the person doing it 
 was, without any fault on his part, so situated at the time that he could not avoided doing 
 the act which caused such harm, to some other person (not being himself), and if he did 
 the one act only in order to avoid doing the other. This section extends to omissions to 
 discharge a legal duty as well as to acts. 
 
                                                 
76
 S Uniacke, Permissible Killing: the Self-Defence Justification of Homicide (Cambridge University Press, 
1994), p.55. 
77
 Stephen & Stephen (eds), A Digest of the Criminal Law (Crimes and Punishments) by the Late Sir 
James Fitzjames Stephen, Bart., 5th edition (London MacMillan & Co., 1894), p.25. 
78
 Sir James Fitzjames Stephen, A History of the Criminal Law of England ii, p.99. 
79
 Ibid, p.103. 
80
 Ibid, p.110. 
Plymouth Law and Criminal Justice Review (2016) 1 
 
63 
 
 Nothing herein contained shall justify any person in any act or omission by which the 
 death of any woman is likely to be caused, in order that any child of which she is 
 pregnant may be born alive. 
 
Stephen also defined both abortion and child destruction as lawful if performed in good faith to 
save the life of the woman (section 168), and stipulated, again, that necessity would not justify 
any ‘act or omission’ by which the death of a pregnant woman was likely to be caused in order 
to save the life of her child. His inclusion of an act of ‘omission’ might suggest that it was a legal 
duty to provide an abortion in the case that the woman’s life was at risk of continued pregnancy 
or childbirth. In Section 67 Stephen provided protection from criminal responsibility for the 
performance of ‘any surgical operation upon any person for his benefit’, provided that the 
operation was ‘reasonable, having regard to the patient’s state at the time, and to all the 
circumstances of the case’.  
 
In 1878, together with Lord Blackburn, Mr Justice Barry and Lord Justice Lush, Stephen was 
appointed to the Royal Commission established to review his criminal code.81 The Commission 
produced a draft criminal code bill that ‘closely followed’ Stephen’s own,82 the Criminal Law 
Consolidation Bill 1879. The commissioners’ bill was presented as a consolidating measure that 
stated extant law and did not ‘increase or diminish’ a discretion presently vested in judges or 
juries. However, in the case of child murder it was held that the current law was inadequate and 
required ‘alteration’.83 The bill maintained Stephen’s definition of a human being, but created 
new offences aimed at child destruction in regard to neglecting to obtain assistance in childbirth. 
Here a woman (and only a woman) could be gaoled for life for intentionally killing her child by 
failing to provide ‘reasonable assistance in her delivery’ if the child died ‘just before’, or during, 
or shortly after birth (Section186). Unlike Stephen’s draft code, in the commissioners’ bill these 
offences were grouped under the heading of ‘Murder, Manslaughter etc’, and separate from 
abortion and sexual offences. Oddly however, in the commissioner’s bill a separate offence of 
‘Killing Child at Birth’ was also bundled in with the abortion (and rape) offences: Section 212 
made it a (non-capital) crime punishable by life imprisonment to cause the death of a child who 
had not fully proceeded from the body of its mother.  
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The commissioners’ bill made a much more comprehensive assault on the question of child 
destruction than did Stephen’s code. However it did stipulate in Section 212 that it was not an 
offence to cause, for the preservation of the life of the mother, a child’s death ‘before, during or 
after its birth’. Stephen apparently ‘encountered great difficulties’ arguing in the Commission for 
his necessity defence in regard to abortion.84 This clause would suggest he was at least partly 
successful, for it appears to include both child destruction and the procuring of therapeutic 
abortion in its defence of acts performed before birth, although in the actual offence of procuring 
a miscarriage (Section 213) the therapeutic defence is not articulated. That section simply 
replicated the existing offence outlined in the Offences Against the Person Act 1861, with the 
exception that the woman herself not be indictable for any abortion offences. Unlike Stephen’s 
code, the commissioners’ bill included no reference to infanticide, which remained to be treated 
as murder.  
 
4 The Modern Aftermath: Necessity and Abortion Law in the Twentieth 
 Century 
The Criminal Law Consolidation Bill 1879 foundered in Parliament, and it was only after 
Stephen’s death that his work greatly influenced laws governing abortion and child killing. After 
repeated parliamentary attempts from 1880, infanticide was recognised as a crime different from 
murder under the 1922 Infanticide Act. The Act left it open to the jury to bring a verdict of 
manslaughter where the woman had killed her newly born child and it was found that she had 
not recovered from the ‘effect of giving birth’. The Infanticide Act 1938 clarified that the child 
could be of any age up to twelve months, and that the woman’s ‘mental imbalance’ was to be 
attributable either to the birth of the child or to the ‘consequences of lactation’.85 As Ward has 
noted, Stephen’s nineteenth century vision of post-natal female offenders as ‘sad’ or ‘mad’, 
rather than ‘bad’, was finally realised.86 During the same period, the definitions of the crimes of 
child destruction and abortion were also greatly influenced by Stephen’s work.  
 
Child destruction was made an offence in English law in 1929, with the architect of the law, Lord 
Darling, finding authority in the recommendations of Stephen and the Law Commissioners when 
proposing the legislation.87 The 1929 law was initially called an infanticide bill, but the 
parliamentary draftsman changed the title to the more accurate Child Destruction Bill. 
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Unfortunately this title seems to have misled some members of the House of Commons, who 
thought the bill was concerned with ‘getting rid of the redundant population’88 and the House 
voted against it. In its third incarnation, as the Infant Life Preservation Act, the bill became law. 
The Act was aimed at women who premeditated the death of their children in birth (as opposed 
to mentally imbalanced post-natal women) and at unscrupulous abortionists who might skirt 
abortion law by procuring very late-term procedures, in the process of birth.89 The Act was never 
intended to target doctors who operated in regard to the woman’s health, and there was 
concern voiced in parliament about the implications for the medical profession.  
 
Given such concerns, Stephen’s necessity clause was added to the offence, which then read: 
 1) [it is a criminal offence for] any person who, with intent to destroy the life of a child 
 capable of being born alive, by any wilful act causes a child to die before it has an 
 existence independent of its mother … Provided that no person shall be found guilty of 
 an offence under this section unless it is proved that the act which caused the death of 
 the child was not done in good faith for the purpose only of preserving the life of the 
 mother. 
 
Although the 1929 Act was aimed at convicting pregnant women who terminated their 
pregnancies at the latest possible stage, it was instrumental, ironically, in securing the 
articulation of lawful abortion in 1938. Modelled on the original 1803 Act, the 1861 abortion law 
appeared to some as ambiguous in providing that it was an offence to unlawfully procure a 
miscarriage. Despite a general acceptance of therapeutic abortion within medical jurisprudence 
in the early twentieth century,90 many doctors still feared that the law was ambiguous. In 1938, 
gynaecologist Aleck Bourne’s case provided an opportunity to clarify the law. Mr Bourne was 
charged under section 58 of the 1861 Act for unlawfully procuring a miscarriage when he 
operated on a 14 year-old girl who had become pregnant after being gang raped by guardsmen. 
Bourne understood that therapeutic abortion was justified but wanted the law clarified as to what 
constituted sufficient risk to the woman’s life and health. In this case, Bourne identified great risk 
to the girl’s mental health if she were not able to have an abortion.91 Justice Macnaghtan noted 
that even at common law there may be justification for an action ‘where an unborn child is killed’ 
just as there may be in the case of homicide.92 As a means to determining this justification, he 
provided the jury with the example of the Infant Life Preservation Act 1929 and stated his 
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opinion that the word ‘unlawfully’ in the 1861 Act ‘imports the meaning’ expressed by the 
necessity clause of the 1929 Act. Finally, he directed the jury that the burden rested on the 
Crown to satisfy beyond reasonable doubt that the defendant ‘did not procure the miscarriage of 
the girl in good faith for the purpose only of preserving her life’.93 Bourne was acquitted, and 
‘therapeutic’ abortions were subsequently performed on psychiatric grounds on an increasingly 
large scale in Britain, governed by the 1938 judgment. In 1967 the Abortion Act responded to 
the widespread practice of abortion. It articulated the Bourne judgment in statute, also making 
special provision for genetic terminations, and providing an international model for abortion 
governance.94  
 
Conclusion 
Contemporary laws governing abortion, child destruction and infanticide represent the 
coalescence of Stephen’s interests in the doctrine of necessity and the mental element of crime, 
and his views on the role of public opinion in shaping law and punishment and on personhood 
and homicide. As his brother Leslie wrote, Stephen insisted that the law was an ‘organ of the 
moral sense of the community’;95 it operated in a reflexive relationship with public opinion: 
punishment influenced the public’s perception of the heinousness of an offence, but at the same 
time it drew its legitimacy from public morality. Hence the real limit to deterrent punishment was 
‘public feeling’.96 In cases of child killing by mothers, and of abortion, Stephen argued that there 
simply was not public support for either offence to be considered capital, with such widespread 
public sympathy evident for women in the ‘miserable condition’ of unplanned pregnancy. Capital 
punishment in such cases ‘violate[d] the moral sentiment of the country’.97 Abortion Stephen 
understood not in terms of the calculation of homicide, but rather as either a legitimate medical 
procedure or as an act concerned with sexual regulation, or in the case of child destruction, as 
involving the desperation of infanticide. The ‘madness’ of women during and immediately after 
pregnancy when they had ‘so little control’ over their conduct, and their motivation to hide their 
shame of illegitimate birth,98 made abortion, child destruction and infanticide wholly distinct from 
homicide in both motivation and intention. Certainly Stephen condemned women whom he 
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thought had acted with criminal cruelty, malice and forethought, and disregard for the law, but in 
cases he understood as sexual misconduct, or as involving no injury to society or any 
reasonable creature in being, Stephen argued against the death penalty and for an 
understanding of the crime that reflected public opinion and morality. Ward has criticised 
Stephen for the underlying assumption of his work that women, especially ‘fallen woman’, are 
the antithesis of the ‘autonomous, rational masculine self’.99 Jurisdictions that govern abortion 
by reference to the doctrine of necessity are also subject to criticism, with the defence described 
as ‘indeterminate’ and weak, if not inconsistent with fundamental principles of the common 
law.100 Regardless, Stephen’s radical Victorian formulations of the crimes of abortion and child-
killing were influential and longstanding. 
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